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Abstract
The concept of commissioning has risen in prominence in recent years as a result of
ongoing reforms to the funding and delivery of public services in the UK. The model of
commissioning constructed by policy has however been overlaid on existing practices, which
themselves differ between different service areas. This paper, focusing on commissioning of
third sector organisations (TSOs) in the field of community mental health services, shows that
its introduction has not led to the straightforward public sector ‘marketisation’ that advocates
desire or that critics fear. Instead, commissioning has led to an indeterminate outcome or
‘halfway house’ position in which the status and role of commissioning remains somewhat
muddled – both internally to participants within public sector organisations and externally
in terms of the experience of the interface by TSOs. We found that commissioning as it is
actually practiced remains contested and political – it is a highly relational process dependent
on personal practices and skills and on personal relationships between stakeholders – and
is therefore not fully managerialised or marketised. This has implications for the policy and
practice of commissioning and the interpretation of more ‘open’ public services.
Introduction
The concept of commissioning has come to occupy a central position in debates
over the reform and management of public services in England after years
of policy whose underpinning rationale was to move various services outside
of the public sector and to recast public sector agencies in a ‘system leader’
role as strategic overseers of a more mixed economy of welfare (Murray, 2011;
Glasby, 2012). This looks certain to continue under the majority Conservative
government elected in May 2015, building on the Health and Social Care Act
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2012. An approach based on commissioning is the culmination of longstanding
reforms beginning in the new public management era with the introduction
of outsourcing, compulsory competitive tendering, the purchaser-provider split
in health and, later, a variety of efforts in the New Labour period aimed at
improving procurement practice across the public sector (Bovaird et al., 2012;
Lonsdale, 2012). In terms of the framing of policy, commissioning is posed
as distinct from, indeed superior to, procurement because it ought to involve
a ‘whole system’ approach, inevitably portrayed as a cycle involving recursive
steps of consultation, design and purchase, and re-design (Cabinet Office, 2006).
Commissioninghashadaparticular resonance for the third sector: cast in theNew
Labour ‘partnership’ discourse as specialist providers with unique attributes, they
were also thought to have been disadvantaged by previous ‘narrow’ competitive
tendering approaches (Carmel and Harlock, 2008). Some commentators thus
viewed commissioning as potentially a positive development for state-sector
relations (Navca, 2010).
However, commissioning has been a contested concept, with debates hinging
on the extent to which successive governments – from New Labour to the
Conservative Government formed in 2015 – have, despite some ‘progressive’
rhetoric, viewed commissioning simply as a tool within the agenda to ‘open
up’ and privatise the delivery of public services (HM Government, 2011).
Under Conservative-led administrations, these trends have accelerated, with
commissioning viewed in a more narrowly instrumental manner as a market-
based mechanism to drive through greater externalisation, introduce greater
competition, reduce costs, and arguably to favour commercial providers. This is
set against the backdrop of wide-ranging structural changes to the NHS in the
2012Health and Social Care Act, as well as new commissioning arrangements for
probation services and other fields (Dominey, 2012; Milbourne and Cushman,
2015). At the same time, commissioning implies a complex set of shifts in
governance arrangements, including the need to strategically manage a ‘market’
of providers, and to focus on achieving particular outcomes for targeted
populations (Rees, 2014). Commissioners are meant to use their purchasing
and influencing power to ensure that publicly funded services are shaped to
achieve the desired outcomes with the resources available (Miller and Rees,
2014). Moreover the fact remains that there is continuity between both New
Labour’s ‘partnership’ and theCoalition’s ‘Big Society’ rhetorical emphasis on the
role of the third sector (compare Cabinet Office, 2006; HM Government, 2011).
The role, trajectory and experience of third sector organisations in engaging in
commissioning and public service markets thus remains an important object of
study.
This paper reports on a study with exactly this focus, in the field of local
mental health services, which are commissioned by local authorities and the
NHS in the case study conurbation. There are three main reasons why this
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focus is important in a wider social policy context. Firstly the third sector is a
significant provider of services within the landscape of mental health provision,
where it is both contracted to provide publicly-funded services as well as a range
of services from charitable and voluntary resources which can be considered
part of the mix of services provided to the public. Secondly, as mentioned,
successive governments have placed considerable emphasis on encouraging
greater involvement of the third sector inmental health service provision. Studies
have consistently drawn attention to the difficulties and tensions experienced by
TSOs when engaging with public sector commissioning processes. They have
allegedly struggled to win contracts, baulked at threats to their independence
and autonomy from intrusive monitoring requirements, and some have argued
they have been progressively squeezed out of public services markets (Neville,
2010; Damm, 2014). Thirdly, therefore, it is important to reflect on whether
commissioning is working well in terms of engaging a wide variety of providers,
and is providing a platform that is fair (a ‘level playing field’) and in what
ways it might be improved for the good of service users and citizens more
generally. ‘Fairness’ has particular relevance when judging whether the outcome
of commissioning – diversity of supply versus domination (‘privatisation’) by
private sector providers – ultimately lends credence to commissioning as an
approach. Additionally, an important advantage of this study is that the interview
respondents from local TSOs have often been working in the area for a long
period, presenting the opportunity for a quasi-longitudinal view on ‘pre- and
post-commissioning life’.
The research underpinning this paper had two broad aims: to explore the
extent to which commissioning policy had been implemented in the field of
mental health services and tounderstandTSOs’ experiencesof the commissioning
environment. Advocates of the commissioning, choice and competition agenda
have argued that commissioning will lead to more diversified and effective
services, provided outside of the public sector at lower cost (Blatchford and
Gash, 2012). Academic perspectives tend to be more critical, suggesting that
commissioning is central to an agenda of marketisation and privatisation,
weakening democratic control of services (Larner and Butler, 2005; Davies,
2008). However, between these poles there is a relative lack of literature based on
empirical research examining in detail the reality and impact of commissioning
in practice (Huxley et al., 2010; Martikke and Moxham, 2010; Bovaird et al.,
2012). Research has however highlighted that the status and ultimate impact of
commissioning in affecting the design and delivery of health and social care
systems has been ambiguous, and commissioning has not always been well
understood by different groups of professionals (Checkland et al., 2012; Harlock,
2014). The research reported here suggests that the status of commissioning is
more ambiguous and contested than either side has acknowledged, and there is
significant continuitywith past approaches. Commissioning is not necessarily the
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transformative mechanism that either side hopes or fears. The paper first sets out
the policy and research literatures that underpinmoves to commissioning, before
outlining the approach to the research. Next it outlines the findings in two main
areas: the degree to which there has been change associated with the introduction
of the commissioning approach, and whether the commissioning ‘cycle’ has
been implemented; and the emerging consequences for relationships within
the provider ‘market’ in mental health services. The final section summarises
conclusions and implications.
Commissioning and Local Mental Health Services
Commissioning is invariably envisionedas a cyclical process, andhasbeendefined
as the ‘cycle of assessing theneedsofpeople in anarea, designing and then securing
an appropriate service’ (CabinetOffice, 2006: 4;Glasby, 2012).Althoughdivergent
approaches have operated concurrently across policy domains and at different
scales of government (Bovaird et al., 2012), there are core elements within them –
gatheringdata on apopulationor sub-populations inorder tounderstand current
and future need, working with other partners in order to prioritise areas for
investment/disinvestment, andpublic bodies deploying their power as purchasers
within mixed economies of provision to promote choice and efficiency (Murray,
2011). Procurement is often portrayed as a sub-set of commissioning activity,
either a discrete step in the commissioning cycle, or a separate but linked cycle
that runs within the direction set by the commissioning strategy. Government
guidance also underlines the importance of the active engagement of people who
may access these services, aswell as local communities and agencieswith specialist
and/or local knowledge in the whole process – and thus the role of third sector
organisations (TSOs) as contributors and intermediaries has often been stressed
in addition to their delivery role (Navca, 2010). A key objective of the current
mental health strategy is to enable recovery through supporting people to have
more control over personal decisions and symptoms, and to have lives ‘beyond
illness’ (DoH, 2011; Slade, 2009). Commissioners can promote a recovery model
by engagingpeoplewithmental healthproblems in commissioningprocesses, and
also through opening up the opportunity for personal budgets (Heginbotham
and Newbigging, 2013).
In relation to the third sector, a consistent theme has been disappointment
with progress in fully involving TSOs throughout the commissioning cycle;
and thus failure to maximise the role of the third sector in contributing
novel approaches and user and community ‘voices’ (Murray, 2011; White,
2011). Literature highlights that TSOs face obstacles to greater involvement
in commissioning, including knowledge gaps on both sides, as well as
TSOs’ lack of the financial capacity, skills and size to engage in such time-
and resource-consuming activities (Packwood, 2007; Martikke and Moxham,
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2010). It has also highlighted fears of the adverse impact on the sector
through threats to its independence, mission and long-term sustainability,
suggesting that even potentially ‘contracting-ready’ TSOs might shy away
from commissioning processes (Osborne and McLaughlin, 2002; Buckingham,
2009). The combination of these issues influenced a policy debate that sought
ways in which to improve commissioning, as demonstrated in the idea of
‘intelligent commissioning’ (Navca, 2010). Furthermore, it was recognised that
in the context of local public sector commissioning, the existing ‘ecosystems’
of third sector providers may be particularly fragile. An acceptance of this
weakness was embedded in the Labour government’s ‘partnership’ approach
to building up the third sector role in public service delivery: significant
resources were devoted to building capacity and professionalisation through
programmes like Futurebuilders, as well as the creation of a Compact to
encourage high standards in financial relationships prior to 2010 (Carmel
and Harlock, 2008; Macmillan, 2010). On the public sector side, an initial
National Procurement Strategy was followed by a National Programme for
Third Sector Commissioning aimed at improving the understanding of the
third sector by commissioners through training and information sharing; as
well as eight principles of good commissioning (ODPM/LGA, 2003; Murray,
2011). To summarise therefore, substantial expectations have been loaded onto
the concept of commissioning: underpinned by an assumption that, at least when
properly conducted, commissioning should be cyclical, inclusive and lead to an
improvement in services.
The mental health policy context in England is one in which there have
been major improvements over recent years in relation to the closure of long-
stay hospitals and the provision of community-based crisis services. People with
mental health problems continue though to be subject to considerable social
disadvantage in relation to employment, general health and offending rates
(King’s Fund, 2012). The current strategy in England emphasises the need for
engagement of services beyond specialist mental health provision if people’s
wellbeing is to be improved, although concerns continue regarding the level of
funding provided for specialist services (DoH, 2011; CEP, 2012). The potential
benefit of involving the third sector in both the commissioning process and
in service delivery has been underlined in mental health policy and guidance.
Whilst approximately a quarter (26 per cent) of the services purchased by the
NHS in 2011/12 were provided by non-statutory (i.e. private and third sector)
organisations (Mental Health Strategies, 2012), NHS providers continue to
dominate key service areas such as crisis support, clinical care and community
teams. Common services provided by the third sector are advice, counselling and
education, with the sector also being dominant or strong players in advocacy,
employment, respite and home support services. Beyond their role in direct
delivery, TSOs have historically played a significant role in raising awareness of
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TABLE 1. Case study characteristics
Local authority
location
Population size
(approx.) Type
Number of interviews
(TSOs/ commissioners)
Gender of
respondents
(M/F)
1 1.1m Central urban (14/3) (10/7)
2 315,000 Urban/suburban (4/1) (1/4)
3 205,000 Suburban/rural (5/2) (2/5)
the needs of people with mental health problems, in developing and sharing new
approaches, and in campaigning for changes in law and policy (Miller and Rees,
2014). These roles continue with, for example, significant involvement in the
development of the implementation framework for the current national strategy
(DoH, 2012).
Methodology
The research followed a sequential mixed methods design (Creswell and Clark,
2011) involving three main stages. The first included a review of academic and
policy literature, summaries of which were published in Miller (2013) and Rees
(2014); as well as consideration of relevant policy and practice grey literature. A
large English conurbation comprising three contiguous local authorities (LAs)
with contrasting spatial and demographic characteristics, in a broadly East-
West orientation across the metropolitan area was selected as a case study (see
Table 1 for brief characteristics). A small number of informal interviews were
carried out with respondents from sector representative bodies and larger TSOs
providing mental health services in the area. These scoping interviews were
used to further explore the issues identified through desk-based research and to
identify which public sector commissioning agencies were involved (principally
local authority departments and the NHS). The second stage involved an
online survey of mental health TSOs in the three LAs, which explored: TSOs’
experience of being ‘procured’ by the public sector, their experience of the
commissioning cycle, and the impact of these processes on their organisation.
Potential respondents were identified through lists of mental health TSOs held
by local infrastructure bodies, supplemented with web searches. The means of
contacting them varied depending on the completeness of local ‘listings’, and
included direct email approaches and advertisement on the infrastructure body’s
websites. Consequently the questionnaire was well targeted but there was no way
to establish the response rate. The survey elicited sixteen valid responses, with
a roughly equal split between the three local authorities. The data were collated
and analysed qualitatively due to the small sample size. Despite the infeasibility
of quantitative analysis, the survey was successful in eliciting TSOs’ experiences
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of – and attitudes to – commissioning, confirming the agencies involved in
commissioning, and refining the sample of TSOs for follow up through in-depth
interviews.
The third stage involved in-depth qualitative interviews carried out with
representatives of TSOs (n = 23) and individual commissioners (n = 6) (see
Table 1). A purposive sample of TSOs was constructed with the aim that
it should reflect the range of services provided by TSOs for people with
mental health difficulties. These services were: advocacy and representation;
social care (including domiciliary care, residential care and day activities);
supported housing; employment; advice and counselling; and support for
carers. The purposive sample was built from organisations identified in
scoping activities, and from the survey responses, and was further expanded
through ‘snowballing’ from interview respondents, as well as attendance at
local ‘network’ events such as ‘Third Sector Forums’. In the instances where
interview respondents had responded to the survey, their answers to the
questionnaire were probed in more depth and, once this was exhausted, a
semi-structured interview schedule was used. The schedule explored three main
themes: perceptions of the difference that commissioning policy had made,
and whether the commissioning cycle operated in practice; the impact of
commissioning on organisations and their relationships with commissioners
and other TSOs; and the degree to which services were becoming better
integrated.
The majority of TSO interviews were carried out with either chief executives
or senior managers. But in some cases, they were joint interviews involving
a senior manager and a more ‘frontline’ employee (for example, a chief
executive and a project worker). Commissioners were identified through the
TSO interviews, as well as the earlier scoping activities detailed above. Relevant
commissioners worked in local authorities or Clinical Commissioning Groups,
or in joint NHS/LA commissioning bodies. Interviews were conducted in a
similarmanner, and in the sameperiod, using a revised semi-structured interview
schedule. As a result of the relatively small number of organisations, and tightly-
definedgeographical area, in this paper interviewquotations are fully anonymised
and attributed only to ‘TSO’ or ‘commissioner’. The survey data are not explicitly
reported on or quoted in this paper. All interviews were recorded and transcribed
and the data analysed through a framework method (Gale et al., 2013). The
transcripts were read by all the authors in order to identify a ‘longlist’ of themes
that broadly reflected the research questions and interview schedules, while
allowing for the possibility that further themes would emerge from the data
during coding. The researchers met to share these themes and further refine the
codeswhichwere then applied to thedata.After coding, keydatawere entered into
a spreadsheet matrix organised by theme, to permit further systematic analysis
of groupings within the interview data. Finally, the themes were refined through
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further discussion within the research team and re-examination of the original
data, and used as the basis for the analysis reported in the following sections.
Findings
A. Life before and after the advent of commissioning
As noted above, the interviews took advantage of the fact that respondents
could reflect in a quasi-longitudinal sense on their and their organisations’
experience of the environment over the period in which commissioning policy
had been introduced. In essence, respondents were encouraged to reflect on what
life was like ‘before commissioning’, how things had changed subsequently (if at
all) and, more contemporaneously, the extent to which commissioning operated
in the cyclical manner envisaged in policy models. There was agreement between
TSOs and commissioners that the situation that existed in the period prior
to commissioning – a period marked by greater informality, widespread use
of grants, and less pronounced contestation of services – was far from ideal.
There was consensus between the groups that the public sector had not always
been sufficiently diligent in using funds, including services being continued that
were potentially not the most effective approach, or where there was insufficient
challenge to providers who may not have been best placed to deliver a service:
We were in danger of some services just being re-commissioned and re-commissioned and re-
commissioned without much thought going into ‘are these clients actually achieving long-term
outcomes from using this service?’ (TSO)
Some of the historic contracts that I’ve seen were bloody stupid at the outset; what on Earth
possessed us to suggest it and what on Earth possessed the commissioners to buy it, in terms of
the nature of the service and the cost of it? (TSO).
Commissioners acknowledged many of the criticisms of the historical situation
that were made by TSOs. Perhaps unsurprisingly though, being more familiar
with the strategic intention of their organisation, the TSOs argued that
commissioning – and in particular, the implementation of a more coherent
cycle – had had a real impact on the core relationship between commissioners
and providers, as well as on resultant service quality. As a result, it was argued,
the public sector now had a better awareness of what money was being spent
and were in a better position to scrutinise and review how it was being used in
prospect:
I think we’re gettingmore sophisticated . . . because the information’s getting better. In the past
you know trying to get any mental health information was just an absolute nightmare. You
know, you couldn’t rely on it, it was never reconciled, it was never validated, you know a lot
of it was paper records, a lot of it wasn’t put on in a timely way. It was really difficult to have
reliable information that you could – you could base your work on . . . (Commissioner).
A second area of consensus concerned a strong sense of underlying continuity
– particularly in the core financial relationship between individual TSOs and
use, available at http:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0047279416000362
Downloaded from http:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Birmingham, on 22 Sep 2016 at 14:00:42, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
new model for third sector public services purchase 9
Figure 1. The commissioning cycle. Source: Institute of Public Care (IPC, 2008)
their commissioning agency. For many of the TSOs in the study, contracts
had been ‘rolled over’ for many years, without being subject to an overt
competitive tendering process. As a result, the idea of distinct ‘before’ and
‘after’ commissioning periods – despite acknowledgement that a policy shift
had occurred – resonated with few respondents:
The issue is quite complicated isn’t it, in terms of when the commissioning actually replaced
what was there before, because there’s all the overlap in terms of contracts and . . . [there is
doubt, therefore] I think, whether commissioning actually is that different. (TSO)
When it comes to a more contemporary experience of commissioning processes,
and particularly the extent to which a commissioning cycle has actually been
implemented, viewswere verymixed. In variance to the idealisedmodel (Figure 1)
TSOs reported experiencing commissioning in a truncated form. For them
the key periods were a) a phase spanning the competitive tendering process,
incorporating: ‘pre-tendering’ (consultation, dialogue with commissioners)
and ‘tendering’ (competitive phase); b) a phase of ‘contracting, delivery and
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monitoring’. Most TSOs described commissioning as something that was being
done to them: ‘being commissioned’ which in many ways was just a different
way of saying ‘being purchased’. There was little sense that TSOs felt consistently
engaged in public sector ‘review, analysis, plan’ activities, but rather, on an ad
hoc or informal basis. In contrast, some TSOs, engaged in specific sub-fields
which had undergone a period of policy redesign or restructuring, reported
being involved in a much more thorough engagement with commissioners. This
was cited as evidence that commissioning policy had indeed had an impact on
practice.
Furthermore, TSOs were often highly critical of those steps within the
commissioning process that could be identified. To take ‘competitive tendering’
first, TSOs complained of inconsistent approaches between different public
sector agencies and most reported experiencing frustration caused by delays,
apparent u-turns and occasionally unexplained termination of tender processes.
Concerns were also expressed about the way in which tenders were advertised,
with particular reference to the difficulty for smaller organisations in keeping
abreast of opportunities, and the negative impact that uncertainty over funding
had on the provision of existing services:
It’s always been like that since I’ve known it, it’s very chaotic communication. And sort of
sudden attempts to consult the third sector and then they never really come to anything . . . I
think with all these things they have tried to have a cycle but there’s been slippage. (TSO)
In relation to thenext phase, ‘contracting anddelivery’, TSOs commonly reported
that receiving a contract did not spell the end of financial uncertainty and
instability but, rather, continuing frustration or ‘chaos’. Indeed, for a number of
TSOs, simply getting a copy of their contract appeared to be a challenge in itself:
It’s still sometimes all too difficult to finish off with a commissioner the niceties of contractual
agreements and other things and so it can be hard work getting proper documentation about
contracts that you’re commissioned to provide. (TSO)
Some saw willingness to engage with commissioning as a means to gain greater
assurance about what funding would be provided to them. For some, the process
was compared favourably to scenarios they had experienced in the past in which
grants were renewed on a short-term basis whilst longer-term funding decisions
were made, and they were ‘kept in limbo’. However, this has to be set against a
morewidespreadperception that the processwas complex and confusing,making
forward financial planning and management difficult:
I’ve currently got about four different extensions on the go from the local authority, because
they are just slowly getting their acts together, aren’t they? The situation we’re in at the moment
is that we are uncertain beyond September whether we’ve got any NHS work under contract.
(TSO)
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Finally, TSOs were also critical of the way monitoring was carried out by
commissioners. Monitoring was described as often being based on quantitative
measurements of service uptake rather than capturing the experience of people
who were supported. This was seen to reflect a ‘hands off’ approach by
commissioners in relation to the contracted services and several participants
expressed a wish for a more robust, active and engaged monitoring process:
They’re very used to quantitative targets . . . and giving you numbers and number-crunching
and all this sort of thing, but they don’t pay attention to the soft outcomes and they don’t pay
attention to the amount of time that it takes for people like support workers, for example, to
have to deal with a case, and every case is different. (TSO)
Commissioners,while acknowledging suchconcerns, aswell as constraints related
to capacity and expertise, also levelled criticism at TSOs. They reported differing
experiences of the willingness of TSOs to engage with such processes, with
examples of TSOs resisting attempts for more robust frameworks:
There’s a combination in terms of commissioning you’ve got to really have that sort of level of
discipline to have both sides in it. You can’t just give me a verbal update; we’ve got to have that
evidence of what they’ve done and all the rest of it. (Commissioner)
As the findings outlined here illustrate, the issue of change over time is far
from straightforward and perceptions of the issue, by respondents from TSOs
in particular, are variable, depending on their individual and organisational
experiences and characteristics, and their position in the market. On the one
hand, many respondents struggled to define a clear periodisation of before- and
after-commissioning: a significant factor here was a clear sense of continuity
stemming from the long-term nature of contractual relationships. On the
other hand, respondents – from TSOs and commissioning agencies alike –
believed that commissioning policy had ushered in more rigorous approaches
to accountability, assessment of spending and service monitoring; they also
recognised an increase in contestability and the opportunities and challenges that
resulted. For yet others, the sense of continuity was reinforced by an awareness
that the core communicative and financial relationship between public sector and
providers had historically been, and continued to be, a source of frustration and
uncertainty. This relational aspect – between commissioners and commissioned,
and between providers competing in a ‘market’ – is therefore crucial, and is
explored in more depth in the next section.
B. Commissioning in a relational perspective: competition and
market stewardship
Managing a (fragile) provider market
Commissioners are required to play a difficult balancing act in that,
to be regarded as successful, commissioning processes need to demonstrate
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that they can adequately steward a local ‘market’ of providers, which can
include public sector agencies, to create services that meet expectations (HM
Government, 2011). Commissioners have a difficult task in balancing this role
with sometimes competing requirements to ensure a relatively transparent and
fair competitive process that is regarded by providers as above board (for instance,
one local authority in the study had experienced a legal challenge to at least
one procurement process). The ‘relational’ side of their role – consultation,
and attendance at provider forums etc – inevitably requires the development
and maintenance of inter-personal relationships. Clearly, however, this is a
highly ‘positional’ matter, with TSOs perceiving the competitive environment
in different ways depending on their position in the market and, once again,
views often varied concerning appropriate levels of both formal competition and
the ‘cosiness’ of longstanding relationships.
Commissioners stressed that professionalism and probity were key aspects of
their role, particularly in relation to setting parameters that create a competitive
and open process for the allocation of funding. Although there is no legal or
policy requirement that commissioners will deploy competitive approaches in
the awarding of all grants and contracts, there is an expectation that they will
consider all the potential procurement options and be able to justify why a grant
or contract was rolled over or newly allocated to a single organisation rather
than being put out to tender. Commissioners suggested that they tried to deploy
the mechanism that they saw as most appropriate for the service in question,
including working developmentally with an organisation if needed:
We . . . went formally through the single provider route to procurement because actually what
wewanted to dowas ensure that we’ve got the same providers so that actually the capacity across
the localities could be flexed according to where the needs were presenting. (Commissioner)
There was widespread support from TSOs for the opening up of funding
opportunities to other organisations rather than an existing recipient being
supported ad infinitum, and thus potentially opening the door to new ways
of working. This was viewed as having benefits in terms of a better use of public
sector funding. But equally for TSOs themselves it was seen as a positive move in
that it potentially expanded opportunities to provide new services, increase the
range of services, or move into new geographical areas:
It probably has opened upmore things for us . . . so I think when you had a sort of grant-based
regime of doing things, I think it limited the third sector to doing a quite narrow niche of
activities which were, on the whole, to the periphery of things. (TSO)
That is not to say that TSOs did not harbour fears about the impact of more
competitive approaches to the allocation of funding. This was particularly the
case for smaller organisations, who were concerned that they would not have the
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infrastructure, capacity or business skills to compete against larger third sector,
private or NHS organisations:
We’re very good at the grassroots level work and require us to get some good results, but we’re
not good at doing the business end and building the key relationships, marketing what we do,
selling what we do. We don’t have the resources. We’ve never built that kind of skill-set within
particularly small organisations. (TSO)
Competition had also openedup the localmarket to a greater variety of providers,
with some – particularly housing-related – TSOs describing their main rivals as
increasinglybeing fromtheprivate rather than third sector.Whilst commissioners
did value the characteristics seen to be connected with the third sector their
primary interest was in purchasing from an organisation that could deliver
effectively:
As long as someone provides the right service for the right person at the right price it’s not for
us to judge as to whether they happen to be registered with the Charity Commission or floating
on the stock exchange, it’s our job to concentrate on the person who’s receiving the service.
(Commissioner)
As highlighted in the previous section, views on competition varied considerably
amongst TSOs, reflecting a range of factors such as the size and capacity
of organisations, their experience and time within a marketplace and, more
intangibly, their culture and mission. Each influenced their sense of the ‘room’
within the market and the ‘threat’ posed by other providers and funding shifts
(Macmillan et al., 2013). Some TSOs were confident in both competing for
business and also in undertaking relationship building with commissioners as a
way of ‘soft selling’ to them. The latter approach had led to some TSOs being
allocated new funding without going through competitive processes. Strategies
deployedbyTSOs towin additional fundingwithout a tenderingprocess included
piloting a service through their own resources and then using the evidence of
its impact to convince a commissioner of its worth. It is worth noting, however,
that the competitive environment is multi-dimensional and asymmetric: TSOs
reported competitive tensions with public sector agencies, in particular with the
local NHS Foundation Trust.
Process or people? The realities of commissioning practices
Despite the move to more formality in funding processes, most TSO
respondents emphasised the importance of the quality of the relationship with
key individuals within commissioning organisations. A strong and enduring
relationship was seen as important for fostering trust between commissioner and
provider, and it was also seen as a pre-condition for the (often-desired) flexibility
from both parties in what was delivered within a contract, and more informal
sharing of ideas for service improvement. An established relationship meant that
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commissioning decisions to put out a current service to tender could be more
easily accepted and managed:
Our relationship with the Commissioners has been sufficiently strong for us to say pretty much
what we want to say. She’s lovely, lovely, and I mean, she’s as straight as a die . . . she said to me
basically, you know, in 2014 we’re going to have to be looking at all advocacy services with a
view to tender. Well, okay, fine. (TSO)
Equally, many acknowledged that such personal relationships might be seen as
having a ‘dark side’ involving a risk of complacency and the perception of a
‘closed shop’ of providers. For others, however, a close working relationship
between commissioner and provider was justified where (TSOs in particular)
brought expertise to the table that commissioners were lacking:
On occasion it has been as blunt as [commissioners asking]: ‘Well how do we get out of this
mess?’ So we are proud of the relationship that we’ve nurtured locally but if we can’t nurture a
good relationship like that then there’s somethingwrongwith us; we’re local, we’re community-
based, we’re third sector . . . our interest is [this local authority area] and we’ve been here a
bloody long time. (TSO)
Inevitably, with the efficacy of commissioning so dependent on the ‘relational’
personal qualities and soft skills commissioners must possess, there is a question
mark over the extent to which they have been equipped with the complex skills
required. Recent government policy that has encouraged a focus on improving
the skills of commissioners and enhancing the professional standing of the role
appears justified given the emphasis placed on this issue by TSOs (University
of Birmingham, 2014). Commissioners for their part stressed the complexity
involved in procurement and contracting, with some being candid about their
own confidence and the capacity of their organisations to respond sufficiently to
these demands:
Contracting is a very, very specialist skill. You know I as a commissioner have not got the
contracting nous or the legal knowledge . . . You know, that’s one of the big difficulties. You
need proper contracting capacity to be able to deliver those. (Commissioner)
More generally, the interview data make clear the vulnerability of the public
sector commissioning function to the loss of key staff within the commissioning
team, whether through redundancy, promotion or relocation, or new demands
on their time. An important part of the backdrop to such concerns were the
expected impacts of reforms associated with the Health and Social Care Act
2012, as well as austerity-related cuts, which were just beginning to be felt in the
research period:
I think the changes in the infrastructure and the management . . . impacts on the consistency
of where we go. We get so far and I think it kind of halts because suddenly the commissioners
change or there’s a reshaping of the structures and we kind of stand still for a while and then
we go back a bit and then we go forward a bit. (TSO)
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It was also widely perceived that little was being done to offset such problems
through, for example, more robust approaches to information-sharing and
contractual systems within the public sector. TSOs reported that they had
repeatedly re-provided basic information on their organisations and what they
had been commissioned to deliver, and had to re-educate commissioners on
the underlying thinking behind local strategies. Finally, co-ordination between
the work of different service areas of the public sector has been recognised as a
vital issue in general and within mental health in particular (Dickinson et al.,
2014). Co-ordination appears to have been problematic on a number of levels:
Commissioners were themselves working in agency or user-group silos both
between and within the same organisations; they did not always seem to be
able to influence the practice of their professional colleagues within social work
and NHS mental health teams to co-operate with each other or the voluntary
sector; and as a consequence users often experienced services as fragmented and
confusing.
I’m not sure, having been commissioned originally through the PCT, that it was ever joined
up in the first place. I think there was NHS within NHS within NHS still. There’s four levels of
NHS that aren’t talking to each other already potentially. (TSO)
The structural separation of commissioners and commissioning teams was
thought to be mirrored in, and to some degree generated by, the organisation of
budgets, with TSOs perceiving that commissioners were in competition to attract
or maintain the budget available to their user group. This led to a number of
examples in which commissioners appeared to be in dispute about who should
pay for a contracted service, which resulted in TSOs being passed between
organisations or teams.
Discussion and Conclusion
This research examined a case study of local commissioning – within a defined
geographical and service field – and with particular focus on TSOs, who are
significant providers of local mental health services. Those in favour of market-
based reforms see commissioning as a model that promotes greater provider
diversity, entrenching theprincipleof contestability and the competitive approach
to the allocation of funding. A parallel policy aspiration is reflected in the fact
that commissioning grew in status in a period in which there was governmental
interest in expanding the third sector role in the delivery of public services. Thus
it was hoped that commissioning would provide amore ‘holistic’ and ‘intelligent’
approach than narrow procurement (Osborne and McLaughlin, 2002; Carmel
and Harlock, 2008). Indeed, such rhetoric has continued under a Conservative
government even as the ‘Big Society’ discourse has been jettisoned. The overall
finding of the research is that the status of commissioning remains contested
and its longer-term development, and impact, is far from certain. The question
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of whether commissioning is a genuinely novel approach, bringing about a
transformation in ‘purchasing’ practices, and capable in the longer term of
delivering the sorts of outcomes hoped for by policymakers and politicians,
remains uncertain at this local level. Caution is therefore required from both
advocates and critics of commissioning.
The research took a quasi-longitudinal perspective and, on the question
of change, the data reveal a significant experience of underlying continuity
across the period in which commissioning has been introduced. Research
participants struggled to identify a ‘before’ or ‘after’ commissioning, although
they were cognisant of the complex layers of policy and practice development
that have influenced what is at its core a public sector function concerned
with purchasing services. Consequently, it is difficult to isolate the impact that
commissioning as a process has had on the relationship between commissioners
and providers. The paper identifies two main reasons underlying this continuity.
Firstly the fundamental experience of many providers was of an enduring
funding relationship with public sector agencies. Many providers had been
contracted for a long period, outlasting various policy shifts; and they could
also point to longstanding collaborative and communicative relationships
with individual commissioners. Secondly, providers often felt that ‘little had
changed’ given that negative experiences – poor communication, failure to
consult, ‘chaos’ and ‘u-turns’, and numerous specific quibbles over contractual
issues – characterised the entire period, regardless of the overarching policy
paradigm.
Somewhat contrasting with this strong strand of continuity, respondents
(commissioners and TSOs) did point to more limited evidence that
commissioning had had a – largely positive – impact on practice. This reflects
the fact that reforms have been incremental: they have been used to reshape
and redesign particular services, and to bring in a limited range of new
providers, rather than to usher in a ‘revolution’. Arguably this reflects the skill
of commissioners and other stakeholders in maintaining services in sometimes
difficult circumstances. Positive interpretations of this shift highlighted that it had
introduced a more rigorous approach to planning, monitoring and regulating
providers, implying amore effective use of publicmoney, as well as a greater focus
on outcomes (including recovery) and service improvement. While perhaps not
yet fully realised, for both sides of the commissioning divide, it appears to have
created a more deliberative space in which to reassess the value and impact
of services and modes of delivery. A more negative interpretation linked the
commissioning approach with the adoption of ‘managerial’ practices, including
the more widespread use of online forms of communication and the adoption
of inflexible appraisal approaches that were seen as ‘tick boxy’, ‘clinical’ and
‘dehumanised’ – in contrast to the more flexible and personal approaches which
were thought to have dominated in the past. This research did not have as one
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of its aims the intention to evaluate claims about the impact of commissioning
on the quality of frontline services. Nevertheless, it is possible to observe that
commissioners felt somewhat removed from such assessments (or it was not
part of their ‘performance metrics’). TSO providers, meanwhile, considered
such assessments to be very difficult, acknowledging the range of confounding
factors impacting on quality (such as cuts to other services and increasing
demands).
The findings reported here chime with previous research (Checkland et al.,
2012; Harlock, 2014) which suggests that commissioning is difficult, conflicted
and often ‘incomplete’. It neither represents the fulfilment of aspirations for
fully marketised services, nor for the holistic or entirely deliberative process
advocated by others. A further key finding therefore is that commissioning
should be understood as a highly relational activity. Public sector commissioners
have to balance competing priorities that are sometimes hard to reconcile.
Commissioners are aware that they represent a public sector purchasing function
that must be seen to be robust and above suspicion. They stressed the need
for professionalism in dealing with providers and the necessity of running
clear and transparent processes. At the same time, policy and guidance requires
commissioners to ‘manage’ a market of providers in order to promote diversity,
and this requires a relational mindset that includes fostering and maintaining
personal relationships. Thus it can be seen that the principles and practice of
‘contestability’ is in tension with the requirement to work relationally. Further,
there is often a sense in which commissioners and providers are mutually
dependent on each other for the continuation of services: at worst the cessation of
certain serviceswould bring political risks for the public sector and their partners.
Moreover, many TSOs were insistent they knew far more about the services
and their users (i.e. information asymmetry) suggesting that commissioners
could not easily replace specific providers, at least not without significant
upheaval.
Overall, these findings have considerable import for policy discussions of
commissioning in the context of further rounds of reform to public services in
England. Commissioners are the lynchpin of the commissioning approach and
it is clear that the importance of individual commissioners (and some were very
highly rated by TSOs for their individual skills and attributes) makes the issue of
staff skills and capacity particularly important. It is apparent that commissioning
systems are particularly vulnerable to staff ‘churn’ and organisational capacity
constraints, which appear to have been exacerbated in the context of the fiscal
austerity implemented since 2010. We advocate caution therefore in portraying
commissioning as either the revolutionary approach heralded by advocates, or
most feared by critics, and suggest a need for further grounded research into the
realities of commissioning especially at the local level. The research suggests that
commissioning is in reality more ‘political’ and open to social construction than
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has often been acknowledged in academic and policy debates. Furthermore, there
maybe ‘hidden agendas’within this arenawhich are rarely publicly acknowledged
(and which by their nature are hard to research).
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